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Abstract—With the recent growth in the number of malicious
activities on the internet, cybersecurity research has seen a boost
in the past few years. However, as certain variants of malware can
provide highly lucrative opportunities for bad actors, significant
resources are dedicated to innovations and improvements by
vast criminal organisations. Among these forms of malware,
ransomware has experienced a significant recent rise as it offers
the perpetrators great financial incentive. Ransomware variants
operate by removing system access from the user by either
locking the system or encrypting some or all of the data, and
subsequently demanding payment or ransom in exchange for
returning system access or providing a decryption key to the
victim. Due to the ubiquity of sensitive data in many aspects of
modern life, many victims of such attacks, be they an individual
home user or operators of a business, are forced to pay the
ransom to regain access to their data, which in many cases does
not happen as renormalisation of system operations is never
guaranteed. As the problem of ransomware does not seem to
be subsiding, it is very important to investigate the underlying
forces driving and facilitating such attacks in order to create
preventative measures. As such, in this paper, we discuss and
provide further insight into variants of ransomware and their
victims in order to understand how and why they have been
targeted and what can be done to prevent or mitigate the effects
of such attacks.
Index Terms—Ransomware, Malware, Cybersecurity, Cryptog-
raphy, Taxonomy.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing influence of automated data handling
systems in various aspects of the daily life of an average
citizen, such as banking, education, health care and many other
public and private services, systems security is becoming ever
more important. Various malicious online activities by large
criminal syndicates or independent individual bad actors now
threaten any operation reliant on computer systems.
Of the numerous strains of malware regularly appearing
online, ransomware is now of particular interest to the cyber-
security community [1] as it is capable of targeting any user
indiscriminately and can inflict irreversible harm on its vic-
tims. A ransomware often exploits low-level operating system
mechanisms or security-based operations, such as cryptogra-
phy, to isolate users from their assets (be these data services or
systems), partially or on the whole. The user can only regain
access if and when a sometimes-hefty “ransom” is paid, and
in many instances, the access to the data is never returned to
the user even if the ransom is paid in full [2]. Consequently,
due to the significant financial gain ransomware can offer the
perpetrators [3], considerable resources are often put behind
Fig. 1: Types of ransomware grouped by attack intensity.
the creation of new and innovative variants, allowing them
to bypass state-of-the-art anti-virus and anti-malware software
[4].
Initially, ransomware attacks seem to have been in the
form of spray-and-prey, with little targeting towards any
particular individual. However, more recently, attackers have
been moving towards more targeted attacks [5] – the so-called
“big game hunting”, in which cybercriminals target high-value
organisations, putting significant value into identifying more
targeted routes of entry.
As a result of this perceived high value for cybercriminals,
the cybersecurity community has had to stay vigilant to
maintain the ability to detect and avert constantly-emerging
ransomware attacks. Malware activities have conventionally
been identified either at the network level [6], [7], system
level [8] or both [9]. For instance, Andronio [10] proposes an
approach that identifies device-locking or encryption activities
at the system level by finding code paths using static taint
analysis along with symbolic execution. In another work,
anomalous file system activities are used to detect ransomware
[11]. Similarly, Scaife et al. [12] attempts to identify abnormal
system behaviour by carefully measuring changes in file type,
similarity measurements and entropy.
With the significant recent advances in machine learning
[13]–[18], learning-based approaches have also found their
way into the expansive literature on ransomware detection and
classification. For example, the approach proposed by Sgan-
durra et al. [19] detects and classifies ransomware variants
by dynamically analysing the behaviour of applications during
the early stages of their installation. Ransomware classification
has also been attempted through combining a static detection
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phase based on the frequency of opcodes prior to installation
and a dynamic method which investigates the use of CPU,
memory and network as well as call statistics during run-
time [20]. Vinayakumar et al. [21] investigates the efficacy
of neural networks used to detect and classify ransomware
activities, with a focus on tuning the hyperparameters and
the architecture of a simple multilayer perceptron. In another
work, Atapour et al. [22] propose a vision-based system that
classifies ransomware variants based on an image of the splash
screen casually captured using a smartphone camera.
Despite the advances in ransomware detection techniques,
the constantly-evolving landscape of ransomware and the
substantial level of diversity among its variants give further
importance to acquiring deeper insight into the nature of
ransomware attacks. In this vein, we take a closer look at
ransomware categories and particularly the types of victims
that are often targeted and regularly fall for ransomware at-
tacks. In Section II, we briefly review the types of ransomware
commonly found in the wild, Section III focuses on the victims
of ransomware attacks and finally, a number of preventative
and response strategies are discussed in Section IV.
II. VARIANTS OF RANSOMWARE
Before attempting to understand the victims of ransomware
attacks, it is important to understand the varieties of ran-
somware and the reasons behind this variation. While the
existing literature contains numerous studies that provide
meaningful taxonomies of ransomware [23]–[26], we primar-
ily focus on aspects of ransomware variants that can directly
contribute to a deeper understanding of their victims.
Ransomware variants can be classified based on their mode
of propagation (e.g. through pre-packaged exploitation kits
[27], affiliate packages built on top of existing malware
infrastructures [28], spam campaigns [28]), payment methods
(e.g. direct digital currency payments [29], pre-paid vouchers,
calls and texts to premium rate numbers, online purchases) and
many other characteristics. However, of the numerous factors
that can aid in the classification of ransomware with respect to
the victims: attack intensity [23], [24] and the user platform
towards which the attack is designed [26] are arguably the
most important. Considering these factors, we provide a very
generic classification of ransomware variants in the following.
A. Attack Intensity
In terms of the intensity of the attacks (the level of threat
a ransomware can pose to an infected system), there are,
in general, three types of ransomware: scareware, locker-
ransomware and crypto-ransomware (Figure 1).
Predominantly, the objective of a scareware is simply to
scare the victim into paying a fee without causing any actual
harm to the computer system [30] and can thus be easily dealt
with. This is usually accomplished by displaying a fake splash
screen on the victim’s computer [22] and asking for a ransom
despite the files and the entire system still being accessible
to the user. In most cases, a scareware might threaten the
victim by alleging that they have found illegal content or viral
infections on the system [31], [32] and exploit the victim’s
fear to extort money.
Conversely, locker-ransomware and crypto-ransomware [7]
can be truly detrimental to system, sometimes causing ir-
reparable damage. Locker-ransomware often takes control of
the locking capabilities of the operating system and denies
the victim access to one or more of the system services or
applications [30]. The system is subsequently left with limited
capabilities, which might only allow the victim to follow the
instructions needed to pay the ransom. However, this form
of ransomware is, in many cases, incapable of successfully
extorting the ransom, especially from skilled PC users, as the
operating system and the files are left intact and unharmed
and it is relatively easy to bypass the locking mechanism.
Crypto-ransomware, on the other hand, employs cryptogra-
phy to encrypt the user’s files [33], essentially removing all
access to the files, leaving the victim with two options: either
pay the ransom or forever lose access to all the encrypted
files (which in many cases will happen even if the ransom is
paid). In essence, the ransom is demanded in exchange for the
decryption key, which is often the only way for the victim to
regain access to the data and/or the system.
When it comes to the profile of the victims targeted by
these types of ransomware, technical knowledge often plays
a critical role. While highly-skilled victims are unlikely to
pay the ransom, except for cases where a crypto-ransomware
has successfully encrypted files which have not been archived
or backed up, unskilled users can fall victim to locker-
ransomware or even scareware. However, depending on the
platform, these variants of ransomware can have different
effects and can cause varying levels of harm. As such, in the
following section, we focus on the platforms different variants
of ransomware might target.
B. Target Platform
Another factor that plays a role in understanding the ran-
somware victims is the platform they use. While PCs and
mobile devices have long been the target of ransomware
attacks, new variants of ransomware now commonly attack
IoT devices and cloud-based systems as well [34]. There
has even been a demonstration that other consumer devices
such as digital cameras can also be successfully targeted
[35]. Encrypting images directly on the camera could have
significant negative impact, especially if the photographer is
working as a professional.
However, due to the wide-spread use of personal computers
for decades, it is expected that they make up the majority
of ransomware targets, and while MS Windows systems are
most commonly attacked, others such as Mac OS and Linux
machines are not entirely immune either [36], [37]. PCs are
often targeted by all three types of ransomware (scareware,
locker-ransomware and crypto-ransomware), with the number
of attacks being on the rise and new variants constantly being
introduced [38], [39].
Due to the ease of use and the low skill levels needed
to operate, mobile devices are now ubiquitously used by a
wide spectrum of individuals, making them ideal targets for
ransomware attacks [40], [41]. Mobile ransomware attacks
have reportedly more than quadrupled since 2015 [42], with
locker-ransomware variants carrying out most of the successful
attacks. This is mainly due to the fact that important personal
files are often kept outside the mobile device, rendering local
encryption attacks against the device useless, and the mobile
operating systems do not offer the manoeuvrability needed
to bypass a locking attack, making them significantly more
effective [26] than locking attacks against a PC.
Recently, there have been numerous reports of attacks on
IoT devices [43], despite such appliances generally not holding
any valuable data. Not unlike mobile attacks, different variants
of locker-ransomware can inflict significant harm to the users
of IoT devices by disabling access, causing power outages and
even disrupting critical services [38]. To understand why and
how certain victims are targeted more often than others, in the
next section, we focus on the victims, themselves.
III. RANSOMWARE VICTIMS
Since significant financial gain continuously drives the cre-
ation and spread of ransomware [3], one of the most effective
methods of combating this type of malware is cutting off
the supply of funds obtained through the ransom paid by
the victims. Hence, a deeper understanding of the typical
victims of ransomware attacks can be very helpful in coming
up with solutions that prevent or mitigate the current fast-
growing ransomware problem. From a top-down perspective,
ransomware victims can broadly be classified into two wide
groups: individuals and business entities. Due to the important
differences between these two groups, the behaviour of the
ransomware targeting these victims is often very different.
A. Individual Home Users
Consumer ransomware often targets individual home users,
which in terms of numbers make up the majority of ran-
somware victims [26]. These individualistic attacks are often
opportunistic and perpetrated via indiscriminate attack vectors.
For instance, the victim might receive a spam e-mail, in which
they are encouraged to click on a malicious link or they
might visit a compromised website infecting the system with
ransomware. In rarer occasions, however, infection can occur
without user engagement through drive-by downloads [44] or
by means of malvertising and ad-injections [45].
Considering the limited resources often available to non-
technical individual victims compared to large corporations
and government-affiliated organisations, the ransom demanded
from the victims is often significantly smaller ($300 to $700)
[38]. When a consumer ransomware attacks a targeted individ-
ual, all the files and resources are normally locked or encrypted
as fast as computationally possible and the ransom note is
quickly displayed in the form of a splash screen [22]. Despite
the more affordable fees demanded by the perpetrators, due
to the large number of infections a single attack can spread
across the world, this type of ransomware attack remains
profitable and incentivises further investment of resources and
development for the perpetrators [46].
Non-technical individuals are also widely targeted by scare-
ware (Section II-A), the variants of which essentially issue
fake warnings and threaten the victim’s files and/or personal
privacy without them ever actually being in any serious danger.
For instance, the famous FakeAV [47] epitomises a typical
scareware by adopting the appearance of a legitimate anti-
virus that warns the user of the supposedly malicious software
it has discovered on the victim’s computer after a fake scan.
Subsequent to the this, payment is demanded, sometimes very
aggressively, to remove the fake malware [30].
With the growth of the ransomware-as-a-service model
[48], even unskilled amateur hackers are now capable of
launching ransomware attacks using pre-fabricated automated
tools, which sometimes come with a consumer support service
to talk the victims through negotiation attempts and payments
[49]. This has a led to an increase in the number of mass in-
discriminate attacks against individuals, necessitating a deeper
analysis and understanding of the situation. While certain
factors such as age, level of education and financial resources
do contribute to the likelihood of an individual falling victim to
a ransomware attack and subsequently paying the ransom, the
level of computer-literacy is the primary determining factor.
While simple solutions such as regular software and operat-
ing system updates [30], [50], e-mail security (on both client
and server side [50], [51]), anti-malware tools [52], access
and authorisation control [53] and simply backing up the data
[54], [55] can significantly reduce the number of successful
ransomware attacks on individuals, the user needs to be aware
of and skilled enough to implement such measures, which
signifies the value of computer-literacy for the public.
B. Business Entities
Despite having access to large IT infrastructures and se-
curity professionals, business organisations also regularly fall
victim to ransomware attacks. Such ransomware attacks are
often a consequence of the more targeted (big game hunting)
attacks where the perpetrator may put significant effort into
preparing a credible social attack against an identified member
of staff. After gaining access through an entry point into the
system, the attack vectors often employed by such ransomware
variants are mostly gradual and covert [38]. The ransomware
usually focuses on avoiding and evading the countermeasures
deployed by the organisation’s security experts and slowly
takes control of specifically targeted data, such as transactional
documents, backups and archives [26]. As expected, large or-
ganisations often receive significantly higher ransom demands
compared to individuals, easily reaching numbers as high as
$10,000 or higher [26].
As far as business entities and organisations are concerned,
the security systems, the type of data and possibly the services
they deal with are the primary factors in their victimisation. In
the following, we focus on the various sectors that are often
targeted by ransomware attacks.
1) Education: In recent years, educational institutions, such
as schools and universities, have become one of the primary
targets of ransomware attacks. In fact, according to a recent
report [56], the educational sector faces the largest number
of attacks per capita with more than 10% of all schools and
universities having been targeted. Many such organisations
have budgetary constraints, limited access to cybersecurity
professionals and smaller teams of often over-worked IT
personnel, yet due to their high rate of network file sharing and
centralised systems [57] can be prime targets for any malware.
Additionally, an average school, university or any other
educational or research institute stores valuable and highly-
sensitive data on students, who might be under the legal
age, staff, intellectual property, financial documents and some-
times even medical records that must not be compromised in
any way. One such ransomware attack was experienced by
University College London, where shared drives and student
management systems were compromised [58] in 2017.
2) Health Industry: Healthcare facilities and hospitals are
also commonly targeted for ransomware attacks, mainly due
to the highly critical data and services that they depend on.
Not having immediate access to a patient’s data can have life-
or-death consequences. A major example of this would be the
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, where a ransom of
$3.7 million was demanded after highly-sensitive medical data
and hospital services were disrupted. The hospital was forced
to pay the ransom since daily administrative operations were
reduced to pen and paper, and more importantly, the life of
the patients was hanging in the balance. This case, however,
is particularly notable as the ransom was negotaited down to
$17,000 and access to the data and services was returned to
the hospital [53] allowing normal operations to resume.
3) Government Agencies: The number of attacks on gov-
ernment agencies tripled from 2015 to 2016 [56] and has
been steadily growing ever since. In 2018, the city of Atlanta,
Georgia suffered a significant ransomware attack. The ran-
somware had found its entry point into the system by means of
a brute-force attack to crack weaker passwords [59]. Although
most services (safety, water and airport operations) were not
compromised, online payment systems and court information
access were severely restricted, potentially affecting up to 6
million people [59] and costing the city over $2.7 million in
recovery efforts.
As government agencies are generally perceived to have
significantly larger funds available to them and many of their
services (e.g. police, water, transportation) are highly critical
and time-sensitive, perpetrators always look for opportunities
to get through the security systems of such organisations in
any way possible.
4) Utilities, Retail and Finance: With the growing reliance
many organisations in the utilities, retail and finance sector
place on computationally-powerful low-latency systems, com-
bined with the significantly heavy costs they can suffer as
a result of any down-time, they have become one of the
recurring targets of ransomware attacks [56]. In many such
companies, and even small to mid-size businesses of similar
nature, the human resources departments are now regularly
preyed on as they often have access to many other sections and
departments within any given company and this connectivity
is very enticing to the perpetrators [60].
5) Emerging Targets: In general, any organisation that
holds sensitive data or offers critical services is always at risk
of a ransomware attack. A law firm, for instance, is always
in danger. While the loss of data can be catastrophic to a
law firm, the possibility of publicising confidential client data
can put an end to the business entirely, which would make
a law firm willing to pay any amount [57]. Industrial control
systems have also largely avoided being targets of ransomware
attacks [61], but this is not because of their level of security
as there are glaring security vulnerabilities that do not seem
to be improving [30]. Any widespread attack on such systems
can lead to a compromise in critical infrastructure, which can
have devastating international consequences.
IV. PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
Since the significant re-emergence of ransomware within the
past few years, many new tools and workarounds have been
suggested to mitigate or recover from a ransomware attack.
However, due to the increasing viability of the business model,
perpetrators invest significant resources to stay ahead of the
cybersecurity community. According to a recent report [62],
the number of ransomware attacks that have been successfully
detected and prevented saw a 30% increase from 2015 to 2016.
However, the overall number of attacks has also notably risen.
Consequently, detecting every new variant of ransomware
might be impossible using a single powerful anti-malware tool,
but there are various techniques that individuals or companies
can employ to protect their systems from a ransomware
infection. Here, we discuss certain measures that can help
with the prevention of or response to a ransomware attack. In
Section IV-A, we discuss some of the most prominent security
techniques that can prevent ransomware attacks and in Section
IV-B, we focus on what should be done in response to an
infection.
A. Prevention Techniques
Attempting to remove a ransomware or re-gaining access to
a corrupted system or encrypted data can be very expensive
and sometimes impossible, even if the ransom is paid. The
best solution, in this case, is prevention. While securing the
system and network activity is extremely important for both
individual users and business organisations, an overwhelming
majority of successful malware attacks are due to human error
[63], so securing the end user is of utmost importance. In the
following, we briefly outline the most important prevention
approaches on the system and the user side.
1) Network/System Security: While certain system and net-
work security measures are more expensive and require expert
support, the majority of the recommendations listed below
apply to both individual home users and business entities:
• A robust backup and archiving system removes the threat
the majority of ransomware attacks can pose.
• Anti-malware and other similar tools are indispensable to
a secure system. Modern tools [52] even take advantage
of machine learning approaches to remove their depen-
dence on knowledge of existing threat signatures.
• In a secure system, all hardware, operating systems, soft-
ware, cloud locations and content management systems
must be patched and up-to-date at all times.
• Via effective system administration, application white-
listing and software restriction policies [64], dubious
programs can be kept off the system, specially for large
companies, where controlling and monitoring all the
employees with system access might not be possible.
• Using a proxy-server and any of the numerous ad-
blocking packages, common ransomware entry points can
be restricted.
• Through network segmentation, virtual machines, and
limited authorisation and privileges, potentially harmful
network access to sensitive data can be averted.
• It is important for any organisation, to introduce access
policies and closely monitor any third parties as they can
easily introduce vulnerabilities into the system.
• Any company with sensitive data requires a response plan
that outlines how the system can be protected if an attack
is detected in its early stages.
2) End User Security: While human error is a significant
cause of ransomware attacks [63], it is not always avoidable.
Nor can we assume that a well-constructed attack would not
thwart even the most security-savvy. Education and training,
both for individuals and businesses with many employees,
can be very effective in preventing, or at least reducing the
likelihood of, a ransomware attack.
• End users need to be aware of social engineering as it is
a common attack vector for many malicious actors [65].
• All end users must be trained on phishing and how it
must be countered.
• Companies should have strict policies about their em-
ployees’ use of the internet as personal emails and social
media websites [66] are regular points of entry for many
ransomware variants.
• It is very important for end users to have strong passwords
as perpetrators can easily gain access to the main system
via various password cracking approaches [67].
B. Response to an Attack
More often than not, when data has been encrypted using
a crypto-ransomware, not many solutions are left available.
However, it is very important, especially for non-skilled indi-
viduals, to ensure the infection has indeed been caused by a
crypto-ransomware as locker-ransomware and scareware can
often be easily removed from most computer systems without
causing serious harm to the system.
Identification is often key when seeking to distinguish
which type of Ransomware has infected the system. In such
situations, knowledge is highly-important especially as many
attackers obfuscate their ransomware to reduce the chance of
easy detection. The “No More Ransom” project [68] provides
a mechanism to identify the ransomware from either the text
within the ransom note or a small number of the encrypted
files. While Atapour et al. offers a more layperson approach
allowing users to take a picture of the ransomware splash
screen and use this for identification [22].
In cases where the algorithm or the key used by the
perpetrators are not strong, a decryption solution might be
available. While certain companies such as Kaspersky and
Windows Defender offer proprietary decryption tools, the No
More Ransom project [68] is specifically dedicated to helping
all victims, whether individual home users or businesses, to
recover their encrypted files without having to pay the ransom.
Finally, one of the most important actions every business
entity or individual home user must take after a ransomware
infection is to report the incident and share as much data
about the incident as possible with the authorities and experts.
Many individuals and companies often remain quiet about such
attacks out of fear of bad publicity. However, reporting such
events can go a long way in putting a stop to similar future
attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
The level of threat that ransomware poses is extremely se-
rious and can disrupt the fabric of our modern data-dependent
society. With the recent rise in cybercrime, it is now more
important than ever to combat the perpetrators of ransomware
attacks and cut off the large supply of funds regularly invested
in the development and improvement of new variants of
ransomware. In this vein, this paper has primarily focused on
facilitating a better understanding of ransomware variants and
the victims often targeted by them. We also provide a brief
classification of ransomware variants and the attack vectors
they are commonly associated with. This is accomplished by
examining the severity of the threat a variant of ransomware
can pose and the platform it is designed to attack. The
paper also discusses the targets predominantly victimised by
ransomware perpetrators to enable further insight into the
underlying forces that drive this malicious business model.
While individual home users make up the majority of the
victims, depending on the type of data they hold or the services
they may provide, businesses can make for more lucrative
targets and are often at a greater risk. Furthermore, we have
briefly considered helpful prevention strategies for individuals
and businesses that fall victim to these attacks and the potential
post-infection recovery techniques that might aid in mitigating
the devastating effects the loss of sensitive data can have on
any victim as paying the ransom is rarely advisable and is not
guaranteed to lead to a full recovery of the data.
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